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The unbearable foreignness of EU law in social policy, 
a sociological approach to law-making 
Jean-Claude Barbier∗ (CES, CNRS) 
& 
Fabrice Colomb∗∗ (Centre Pierre Naville, Université d’Évry) 
 
Abstract 
The main purpose of the present text is assessing EU law from the perspective of its “impact” on 
national systems of social protection, social services and labour law: how does EU governance affect 
“social policy” in the Union? After recalling the main characteristics of EU governance and presenting 
the relevant actors of the making of EU social law, we systematically compare EU and national law 
with respect to two essential dimensions: EU law making in general and the special case of “social 
law”. Eventually we arrive at a global comparative assessment of the respective legitimacies of EU law 
and national legislation. Considered from the point of view of relevant actors interviewed during the 
research, the dynamics of this interaction emerges as structurally constrained but rather open-ended. 
L'insoutenable étrangeté du droit européen en matière de politique sociale. Une 
approche sociologique de l'élaboration du droit 
Résumé  
Dans le cadre d’une vaste étude sur la gouvernance européenne, ce texte entend apprécier l’impact du 
droit européen sur les systèmes nationaux de protection sociale, le droit du travail, les services sociaux 
et les politiques sociales nationales. Après avoir présenté les principales caractéristiques de la 
gouvernance européenne et les acteurs impliqués dans la production du « social » européen, on a 
choisi de comparer systématiquement le « droit social », européen et national, à partir de deux points 
de vue : la production du droit en général et le cas spécifique du droit social. La comparaison débouche 
sur une réflexion en matière de légitimité, s’efforçant de dépasser le classique constat d’un « déficit 
démocratique » au niveau de l’UE, le plus souvent unilatéralement accompagné de l’ignorance de sa 
contrepartie aux autres niveaux territoriaux. L’étude des positions des acteurs pertinents de la 
fabrication du droit européen montre que, loin d’être un procès inexorable, l’extension de l’influence 
du droit européen s’appuie sur des coalitions d’acteurs qui sont parfois inattendues et sur une 
promotion des droits « individuels » vis-à-vis de droits « collectifs ».  
JEL codes: I38, K31, H77 
Keywords: Sociology of European law, European social policy, European Integration, Court of justice 
of the EU, Europeanization. 
Mots clés : Sociologie du droit européen, Politique sociale européenne, Intégration européenne, Cour 
de justice européenne, Européanisation. 
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French Constitution (1958) 
Art. 2. - La langue de la République est le français, L'emblème national est le drapeau tricolore, bleu, 
blanc, rouge. L'hymne national est la Marseillaise. La devise de la République est "Liberté, Égalité, 
Fraternité". Son principe est : gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple et pour le peuple. 
Treaty of the European Union (2009) (English version) 
Art. 2. - The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.  
 
 
Quote from French Union’s representative  
“Sur le bilan de l’intégration européenne en matière sociale, c’est mitigé. Tout n’est pas à jeter, parce 
que le fait qu’il y ait un espace de négociation collective au niveau européen est un moyen 
d’intervention, un espace à occuper pour la création d’un modèle social européen. Il y a aussi un enjeu 
dans l’interprétation des textes européens souvent contradictoires d’un paragraphe à l’autre. C’est 
important pour un syndicat d’avoir une certaine lecture des textes pour pouvoir les utiliser 
conformément à ses propres objectifs syndicaux. Par exemple, il y a un intergroupe sur l’égalité 
homme-femme : quand l’UE demande aux employeurs et aux États de « traquer les inégalités », on 
peut se retourner vers les acteurs nationaux en leur demandant ce qu’ils font des textes européens.” 
(Paris, Gusto Seminar, October, 14th, 2010). 
Quote from a representative in a French federation of French associations 
“Au niveau de l’UE il y a des objectifs en tension : Les objectifs de cohésion économique et sociale et de 
primauté de l’intérêt général entrent en tension avec l’espace économique intégré et le droit de la 
concurrence. Cette tension amène le droit européen à contrôler les aides publiques aux acteurs en 
charge des SSIG. Dans les faits les acteurs économiques sont mieux protégés que ceux qui ont pour 
mission la cohésion sociale. Nous les associations, on nous voit de plus en plus comme des acteurs 
économiques comme les autres. C’est une prise de conscience douloureuse : on minimise la finalité 
d’accès aux droits fondamentaux. L’acteur associatif est considéré comme un prestataire de service 
comme un autre.” (The same Gusto seminar) 
 
Introduction1 
 
How is the EU governed? How does this affect “social policy” in the Union? One could say 
that, basically, it is governed with the help of three main instruments of influence, ideas, 
money and law. Ideas actually play their role through both other channels, but as is well 
known little redistribution of money is involved at the EU level. Economic ideas play an 
overwhelming role, both in the setting up and implementation of macro-economic 
coordination. But they also play a dominant role in EU law, a type of law that is intimately 
                                                            
1 The present text was discussed in two seminars in Paris (CES Paris 1) on the 9th of June, 2011, and in 
Barcelona, on the 6th of September (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona). Both seminars were held in 
the context of the FP7 Framework Programme project GUSTO (http://www.gusto-project.eu/ ). 
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married with economic thought. As we will see, however, EU law does not consist only of 
economic ideas. After recalling the main characteristics of EU governance as we have studied 
it in the context of the FP7 project GUSTO2, the main purpose of the present text is assessing 
EU law from the perspective of its “impact” on national “social policy systems”.  A systematic 
comparison will be in the background, between EU law and national law with respect to two 
essential dimensions: the production of law in general, the special case of social law3. 
Eventually we intend to achieve a global assessment of the relationships existing between EU 
law and social policies – which, as is well known have remained national ever since the first 
phases of the European Communities4 (Barbier, 2008). A distinctive element of the present 
approach is its use of sociological identification of actors we consider relevant and involved in 
the process of EU law-making, beyond the usual formal institutions (the Council, the 
Commission, the Parliament, etc.). We start by presenting them before going over to a short 
presentation of what EU governance is, and to the two sections of the paper, devoted to EU 
law making and to the special insertion of “social law”. 
Main relevant actors in the social domain 
Long term field-work (Barbier, 2006; 2008; 2011) has allowed us to inductively identify the 
relevant actors of European social policy. Our surveys are certainly not representative of their 
entire variety, but through them we have identified the significant types. 
We first find the legal community, which is overwhelmingly trans-national5. It is composed of 
the judiciaries of the member states, the legal professions, experts and professors, and, at the 
EU level, of course includes the Court of Justice and its Tribunal of first instance, (with the 
“legal services” of the European Commission and the Council). As a very condition of 
possibility of its strategic position lies the “validity of praetorian law through specialized 
discourse within the legal profession” (Scharpf, 2000, p. 193). These actors are part of 
“interpretative communities” (Weiler, 1991, p. 2438), and it is a sociological simplification to 
assume, as we do here, that these form a single community. True, various professional 
groups are involved (Dezalay, 2007; Vauchez, 2008), and not only differentiated according to 
national lines. However, there seems to be a consensus in the literature as to the fact that 
national judiciaries and especially courts have eventually provided the main source of 
support for the ex-ECJ (Weiler, 1991). True, this support was uneven across countries and 
across times, and it took a long time to settle down as the accepted legal view. In our 
interviews, while documenting this support as well as the sustained effort of the Commission 
to promote EU law and disseminate a common legal culture, especially in the “new” member 
                                                            
2 This working paper presents results of the research made in the frame of the European project 
“Gusto” (FP7). We thank the members of the working package for their remarks. This text has been 
discussed in several seminars of the research project in Paris, Barcelona and Warwick. It has been as 
well presented during the congress of AFS (Association française de sociologie) in July 2011 in 
Grenoble. 
3 We mean labour law and social protection law. 
4 The present project has entailed the implementation of a diversified group of interviews, in France, in 
Germany and in Brussels (more than 50), with persons of many nations: Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, Denmark. Interviewees were legal scholars, members of NGOs, of Unions, and officials in 
the French administration. About half of the interviews were conducted in the European institutions 
(Commission and Council, Court of Justice of the European Union). Two seminars with practitioners 
in social services and labour law were organized in Paris in October 2010, and in February 2011 
(mainly with lawyers). 
5 There are exceptions of course. In specialized areas of law, some communities have remained mainly 
national. This is for instance the case of the French labour law community (interview, February, 2010, 
law professor). 
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states6, we also find that this “community” of communities is not insulated from social 
influences7. The mere fact that, with time, the national judiciaries and the legal profession 
have come to support EU law and act collectively for its propagation and supremacy, does not 
mean, as we will see, that this supremacy can be actualized without the support of other 
powerful social actors. 
The second main relevant collective actor comprises economic interest groups. It is also well 
documented in the literature that powerful economic actors have a special influence on EU 
law, and privileged access to the benefits of the EU through negative integration (Streeck, 
1999; Scharpf, 2000; Delmas-Marty, 2004; Schmidt, 2006). In the social policy area, these 
interests are also present. We meet them for instance in social protection (private pensions 
providers) and in many areas where competition exists between private and public, or non-
profit provision of services. Housing companies, private childcare, healthcare or long-term 
care providers pursue their interests and try to influence law making and law 
implementation, in particular by way of litigation. We will see that the “economic” nature of 
the interests concerned is precisely a legal question in debate, when it comes to public or 
social services. 
Advocacy organizations, generally labeled “NGOs”, also abound in the Brussels forums, some 
of them being directly funded by the EU Commission itself. Their action is aimed at 
promoting individual rights and the rights of certain groups (for instance the disabled, the 
poor, the homeless, etc.). In Euro jargon, the notion of non-governmental organization is 
extremely elastic and sometimes even includes social partners’ organizations. NGOs form a 
third main collective actor.  
Finally, in the policy area we explore, there is a fourth important group. It comprises actors 
that are in charge of the collective interests of employees and manage social protection 
schemes (of which the trade unions are a typical instance). All these actors act, fight against 
one another, and strike alliances that can be observed in cross- or trans-national arenas and 
forums, where decisions (not only legal) are made, and ideas are (often hotly) debated.  
EU governance as a complex mesh of relationships and actions 
On governance in general, existing literature is so huge that we are unable to address it in 
this paper. We will rather apply the concept in particular to our object, i.e. the European 
Union that forms a regulatory state-like entity (Majone, 1993, 2006). Governance may be 
differentiated according to the steering modes (more or less hierarchical), the instruments 
(Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007), the decision levels (transnational, regional and local), and 
the actors involved (public or private, experts or elected representatives…). When 
characterizing European governance some stress its similarity with management: from this 
angle, European governance might be seen as minimal regulation aiming at easing the way 
for market forces. Other literature however prefers not to discard the political dimension, to 
focus on the involvement of diverse actors and on the autonomy for decision-making at the 
local level. This plurality of meanings is a counterpart to the diverse dimensions and channels 
of European governance; it begs the question of the emergence of “new governance” modes. 
                                                            
6 Interview, magistrate, July 2010. 
7 Interview, former référendaire, February, 2011. 
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We envisage EU governance as: “The combined purposive intervention of relevant EU level 
actors8, forming a constellation of actors, in the coordination, steering and regulation of a 
great variety of policy areas.” As for the substance of the coordination, steering and 
regulation always concern public goods. EU governance is political in many ways, despite the 
“non-partisan” appearance it always takes. Unfortunately, this key dimension – the political 
– is too often underestimated in mainstream social science. As will be illustrated in this 
paper, EU governance is after all not entirely different from government; because of its 
political dimension, it can never be seen as politics-free steering, or as the rational 
management of public choices about public goods: power relationships are always involved 
(Marginson & Keune, 2011). Nevertheless, politics at the EU level are substantively different 
from their counterpart at the national one. True, European élites have always contributed to 
promoting a de-politicized approach of their action: they would like to be seen as taking 
decisions serving common interests and universal values transcending private and national 
ones. This strategy contributes to a surface de-politicization visible in the discourse and 
lexicon used by the EU Commission, especially since the failures of referendums in 2005 
(Barbier, 2011). “De-politicization” is a political claim raised by certain actors, and not only a 
fact per se. Some scholars suggest considering EU democracy in terms of “democratic deficit” 
as utterly irrelevant (see for instance A. Moravcsik, 1998) whereas others argue that they find 
more and more empirical traces of such a “deficit” in sociological surveys. It would certainly 
be difficult to deny that European governance faces specific difficulties in its legitimization 
because of the nature of the EU polity / political system and we will come back to this point. 
Moreover, the argument according to which such deficits also show in opinion surveys at the 
national levels is weak and does not change the problem. The EU polity – that has no 
corresponding political community – is a “consociation” of nation-states (Costa and 
Magnette, 2003). Legitimacy of the parts stems from national-level democratic procedures. 
Legitimacy of the whole cannot easily stem from the same origin: there is no homogenous, let 
alone unique constituency of voters. 
In this paper, our concern is not about bringing about a comprehensive view of EU 
governance: we are only concerned in identifying the “impact” (a “proxy” of it) of this 
combined and coordinated action of actors upon two identified areas of social life, the 
national systems of social protection and the national legal systems in the social domain. In 
order to analyze this, we have to assume that there is a separation between the “EU level” 
instruments, and the “national level” ones; this is an analytical simplification because social 
processes are not, in reality, separated, and because all things “European” (in the sense of 
what happens by way of activities at the quasi-federal level) are ultimately determined (if not 
directly made) by national actors in trans-national situations. In simplified terms EU 
governance may have a wide variety of consequences upon national systems. For this 
influence to materialize, “channels” or” vehicles” are numerous: one is the “application” of 
law9; another one is the coordination of policies by various mechanisms or methods; another 
again maybe the dissemination of ideas, ideologies, ways of doing, practices (often deemed 
“best”), templates. We must start from a list of types of vehicles. 
                                                            
8 Offe (2009) has aptly noted that governance is often seen as a process without a subject: p. 550, 
“something happens, but nobody has done it and would thus be responsible for the result”. This is 
however not the choice adopted here. 
9 M. Hartlapp has studied in detail the process that goes from the first drafting of legal provisions to 
the eventual “implementation” on the ground (Hartlapp, 2007). She shows that there is much more to 
EU law than simple “application”. 
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Inspired by the literature on governance “instruments”, and for the sake of simplifying the 
present analysis, we suggest that five main instruments constitute the core substance of EU 
governance in the area of social protection and social rights. These are: (1) the role of 
legislation and formal regulation10 (here referred to as EU law); because the European 
Central Bank is a fully-fledged authority with its independence and autonomy, some 
regulative decisions it takes (for instance, “prudential” regulation) can be considered as part 
of this first instrument; (2) the second  instrument is money redistribution (essentially here, 
the Structural Funds and the Common Agricultural Policy11; (3) the third instrument of 
coordination acts by way of common standards, strategies, ideas, etc..: here the ideal-typical 
instrument is what has gradually been known as “open methods of coordination (OMCs)”12; 
one of these organizes macroeconomic and monetary coordination (the example is the 
“Broad Economic Policy Guidelines”). Another specific coordination has also existed in the 
area of “sustainable development”. Decisions originating from these methods may be 
transformed into legal instruments of category (1); (4) a fourth instrument of governance is 
provided by negotiations between social partners at the EU level (“social dialogue”, both 
sectoral and cross-sectoral). It is possible to state that (5) a fifth instrument is also involved, 
i.e. communication with the general public. To use V. Schmidt’s typology, this instrument 
mainly refers to a “communicative discourse” type of instrument, as opposed to “co-
ordinative” (Schmidt, 2006).  
All instruments are inserted within systems of actors commanding unequal power resources 
and “ideas” (values, programmes, cognitive frameworks, theories of action...), and some 
forms of learning or dissemination are essential for any coordination to happen. In the case 
of the EU and especially with relationship to the introduction in the late 1990s of the “Open 
methods of coordination” much literature has emphasized the “newness” of such 
instruments, and, more often than not, social scientists were fascinated by what they 
observed to the point of really believing that a kind of Habermassian discursive democracy 
had suddenly come into reality (Jacobssen & Vifell (2003), Goetschy (1999), Zeitlin & 
Trubeck (2003)). Empirical work however has shown that this is at best a dream (or perhaps 
a nightmare) (Barbier (2008), Kröger (2007), Buchs (2007), de la Porte (2008)). Even when 
scholars were able to precisely identify “learning effects”, they had to take into consideration 
that power relationships were involved in what was learned and by whom.  
In the “EU governance of social policy13” though, not all instruments are on an equal footing 
for influence. Some are clearly overarching instruments, namely, law and macroeconomic 
coordination, because of their compulsory nature and the power attached to them. Difficult 
to objectify in strict causal terms, the impact of macroeconomic coordination will not be at 
the centre of the present paper. That the coordination by ideas and various methods of 
coordination is of secondary importance when compared to law and macroeconomic 
coordination will not be explained either in detail here. Neither will be explained in detail the 
                                                            
10 We mainly refer here to “lois et réglementation”. When considered in a cross-national perspective 
“regulation” in English is bound to be ambiguous. Regulation here may be used in a “theory of 
regulation” perspective, and not in the limited sense of legal (or quasi-legal) regulations. Regulation is 
the process by which society regulates itself, from the metaphorically used biological or technical sense 
(see New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, vol. 2, 1993, p. 2530). This concept is also widely used in 
sociology. 
11 It is perhaps also possible to see some of the ECB intervention as comparable with governance by 
redistribution. 
12 These are formally described as “open” since the Lisbon Council in 2000. 
13 This expression can be taken as a résumé of our research object. 
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rather obvious facts that the EU has never been a redistributive political entity. We will 
concentrate on the role of EU law and its peculiar features as an instrument of governance, 
with a “counterfactual” constantly in mind: national law. The analysis will be conducted in 
two steps. The first one concerns the EU law making. In a second step we explore the 
insertion of “social law” in the wider process of EU law.  
The comparative angle adopted here has advantages in its capacity to increase the visibility of 
differences. It has also drawbacks, because it tends to posit EU law and national law as 
systematically comparable, and even more, the EU level of governance as systematically 
distinct and comparable to the national ones. Through the present text, the reader should be 
constantly aware that comparability is valid only to a certain extent. 
 
1. EU law making: asymmetry and democratic legitimisation 
National law has a number of features that have been invented over a long period of time in 
each of the EU polities. Despite similarities, these features are very different from the 
characteristics of EU law and this brings about key consequences. This is what we explore in 
this first “stage”, the stage of “making”14. We start from the classic observation that the EU 
has been accused of an incapacity to live up to expectations in term of its democratic 
functioning, and that a “democratic deficit” is the rule. The most obvious overarching 
criterion is the absence of equivalents of the main institutions that support democratic life at 
the national level. But can this general observation be empirically related to the question of 
the making of law? The EU bureaucracy, or rather oligarchy made of various elites (Barbier, 
2008), is however not alone “in Brussels”, and it commands the support of many 
constituencies. How can one analyze empirically this system of actors that participate in the 
production of law? Understanding these processes and comparing the EU level with the 
national counterpart level in general is a first step prior to understanding any influences on 
social policy. 
1. The difficult task of an objective sociological analysis of legitimacy 
Objectifying legitimacy from a wertfrei (value-free) sociological perspective has always been 
a difficult conundrum for various reasons. The first one is that objective assessment in the 
domain is especially difficult for researchers inevitably marked by normative orientations. 
The second is that the legitimacy of an entity, an institution, a government is difficult to 
disentangle from its politics and its policies. The third difficulty concerns methods: 
sociological methods are based on interviews and quantitative surveys. These are very 
difficult to handle as a tool for evaluating legitimacy, because of the well-known sociological 
critique according to which surveys are instruments for creating artificial opinions. The 
outcomes of polls obviously provide at least an indirect measure of government’s legitimacy, 
but only at a certain point in history. Sociologists remain wary of using flawed instruments. 
In political science, the separation between what is normative and what is strictly analytical is 
more blurred than in sociology, and political scientists are numerous who give answers to 
what legitimacy is, while not always acknowledging that their definitions run the risk of 
normative bias. We can briefly refer to some of this literature.  
                                                            
14 “La production du Droit” in French might not translate as the “production of law “in English. 
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F. Scharpf has had a wide and enduring influence on the international analysis of legitimacy, 
with his telling (and simple) distinction between “output” and “input” democracy  (199915; 
see also 2010). He has brought key dimensions of analysis for the understanding of European 
governance, which he prefers to see as “multi-level”. For Scharpf in the area of social 
protection and social policies – our key concern in this paper – EU governance has resulted 
in privatization and liberalization, especially of public services. But this transformation was 
essentially of the “negative integration” sort, while “positive integration” was always minimal. 
However, although “output legitimacy” can be effectively achieved, it does not displace the 
basic role of “input legitimacy”. In his conclusions, F. Scharpf precisely stresses this problem. 
For him, respecting the inevitable limits of the EU’s area of legitimacy entails that it enjoys a 
limited range of decisions, and this can easily be transgressed (as he argues in his 2010 
paper). In Scharpf’s view, the “limited choice of decisions” available to the EU in order to 
remain legitimate have to meet three criteria: (a) avoid opposition because they stay beyond 
political visibility/salience; (b) provide solutions that minimize conflicts and (c) assume that 
governments will provide support through their own resources of legitimacy. Moreover, in 
the more focussed area of EU law, Scharpf argues, “output legitimacy” tends to presume the 
existence of trust “in the internal mechanisms of the judiciary” but also in the “validity of 
praetorian law through specialized discourse within the legal profession” (2000, p. 193). 
Finally, the construction of “output” legitimacy is eventually based, Scharpf rightly argues, on 
the “effective capacity to solve problems” (ibid., 193), a capacity he tends to see with doubt in 
his recent contributions. In his conclusions, he stresses the empirical absence of three other 
elements in the European polity (2000, p. 191-207): a) a collective identity b) an effective 
political debate c) an institutional infrastructure providing for accountability of responsible 
persons – in the absence of a common electorate. In this respect, “a government can be 
illegitimate even when it is effective” in the absence of a “demos” (ibid.)16. 
V. Schmidt (2006, p.5) adopted a slightly different approach of legitimacy, using the 
reference to American institutions. She distinguished four modes of democracy:  “by and of 
the people” roughly corresponds to traditional “input” legitimacy17. “With » stands for the 
consultation of « organized interests » and « for » corresponds to « effective government » i. 
e., to « ouput legitimacy ». Because she defines the EU as a “regional state”, V. Schmidt tends 
to downplay the problems related to “democratic deficits” and to stress that such deficits are 
mainly situated at the national level (ibid., p. 9). Additionally, V. Schmidt has argued that at 
the EU level, there were “policies without politics”, while at the national level there were 
“politics without policies” (ibid.). For all its undeniable attractiveness, the phrase eventually 
risks being misleading, because European integration cannot but be political throughout. 
This is a different view from Moravcsik’s “pragmatic” stance, proposing a theory along which 
there is no problem of “democratic deficit” in the EU, when one compares it not with 
“idealized” or “imaginary” political systems, but instead with “real-world practices of existing 
governments acting imperfectly under complex constraints” (2004, p. 362). Meny’s (2003) is 
certainly closer to V. Schmidt’s, when he writes that “there is certainly a case for emphasizing 
the weakness of popular support input in European institutions, but the same kind of critique 
should also be addressed to national systems” (2003, p. 9). Empirically, for him, many formal 
                                                            
15 I mainly quote from the French translation (2000). 
16 A theme continuously discussed in the literature (Scharpf, 2009), but also by the Courts and legal 
scholars (see for instance the June 2009 decision by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, about the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
17 Article 2 of the French Constitution states the principle  of the French Republic: « gouvernement du 
peuple, par le peuple et pour le peuple ». 
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institutions at national level have a “weak democratic component”, and the “democratic 
deficit” argument cannot easily be circumvented because “nobody can deny that there is a 
real problem” (ibid., p. 11), a problem different from the national problem.  
Finally, scholars who deny the empirical relevance of legitimacy and of “democratic deficits”, 
whether at the national or at the EU level, seems not to be disturbed by the fact that 
European democracy tends to be closer to a form of oligarchy (Castoriadis, 2005, p. 157). 
Obviously this does not bother scholars who claim to analyse democracy « as it exists » 
(Moravcsik, 2005) and think that, as it is, Europe is protected from the excesses of “direct 
democracy” (Moravcsik, 2002). However scholars do not all think that this second best 
position is satisfying, not only from a normative standpoint, but also for analysis: the 
increasing politicization of some EU debates at the national level (Barbier, 2008) has 
increasingly shown that real problems cannot be easily circumvented. Main referendums, 
from the 1992 Danish to the French and Dutch in 2005, and then to the Irish in 2008 (and 
later, 2009) have clearly demonstrated that the people of Europe are not convinced by the 
“outcomes” that the EU elites seem increasingly desperate to sell them.  One does not have to 
go as far as Jürgen Habermas and invite European elites to “jump over their shadows” 
(« über ihren Schatten springen »18)   (= to go against their own will), in order to allow the 
citizens of Europe expressing their votes in referendums about EU institutions. Still, the 
legitimacy of many European level choices cannot but be questioned. Finally, the assessment 
of EU governance only in terms of “output” legitimacy– however consensual it might be 
among social scientists – cannot conceal the fact that this view first and foremost prevails 
among certain political actors in the EU institutions. These actors comprise EU politicians 
themselves, who claim to be “rational” and “disinterested”, by opposition to national 
politicians (among them “populist” anti-Europeans, or “unreliable” citizens in this respect. 
Tomaso Padoa-Schioppa, a former director of various international financial institutions has 
illustrated the most explicit argument in favour of what one can interpret as “enlightened 
despotism” at the EU level19. He goes as far as writing that “il est absolument impropre de 
parler de déficit de démocratie, comme si nous étions en présence d’un gouvernement basé 
sur autre chose que la volonté du peuple » (2010, p.105). He attributes the fact that « le 
peuple est mécontent, déserte les urnes ou rejette l’Europe par référendum » to the 
insufficient powers given to the EU (what he calls a lack of « kratos”, ibid., p. 105). Funnily 
enough the high level official’s favourite image of Europe is one of the owners in a 
condominium, who, because they are in a “forced cohabitation” have to be “reasonable”. As 
we will see in the following sections, these views are shared not only by the spin doctors of 
the Commission and the political aides who interpret Eurobarometer results in order to 
present the “rosiest picture” possible of the EU: key supporters of this view are to be also 
found among judges, not only but especially in the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). What indeed could better encapsulate the essence of “output” legitimacy, if not EU 
law? This is what we will discuss thereafter. 
Consequently, and irrespective of their own normative views about the legitimacy of the 
Union, an honourable task for empirical sociologists remains: can “democratic deficits” be 
compared between the EU and the national levels, in terms of social policy? Is it possible to 
                                                            
18 Die Zeit, November, 29 2007. 
19 A form of enlightened despotism is also the general tone adopted – consciously or not – in most of 
the writings of the Judges and Advocates General of the CJEU (for this, see Mancini, and Arnull in the 
reference list). 
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compare the “output” performances of national oligarchies and the EU oligarchy with the 
help of objective criteria? This is what we attempt in the following sections of the paper. 
2. Essential features of national law for the stage of law making: input legitimacy is 
the general rule, within an oligarchic functioning 
What do we mean by the making of EU law? We intend to capture the chain of actions 
performed by a host of actors who participate in the process that, in EU forums and arenas 
(Jobert, 2003), starts with the drafting of EU legislation (Directives or Regulations), but also 
of the Commission’s decisions (that are legally binding) and the drafting of the CJEU’s 
decisions. Through a very long chain of actions, this process can be followed up to the point 
when enforceable legal decisions have legal binding effects. By comparison, in the member 
states, the process generally starts by proposals for legislation put before their parliaments, to 
be eventually implemented through decisions by tribunals and by their administrations. In 
both cases, national and quasi-federal, a legal discourse is created, and legitimated, and, after 
this process, as the French saying goes, “nul n’est censé ignorer la loi ».  At least in theory: as 
of principle, all the language versions of EU legislation are equally authentic and can be read 
by any EU citizen in their own language, while, in most cases, legislation which was not 
published in their language is not applicable to them (Kjaer and Adamo, 2011). 
How describe the national process of the making of law in EU democracies in the most 
simplified terms? Law is made and passed by parliaments and by governments. Parliaments 
consist of elected members and, like governments they are accountable to voters according to 
the specific institutional rules of the country20. Law is “implemented” by the administration 
and, in case of litigation by the courts. Judges “implement” the law, and create case-law (the 
role of this jurisprudence being different according to law systems). Generally, a supreme 
court or a functional equivalent of a constitutional court is in charge of deciding whether laws 
passed by the legislative and the executive are compatible with the Constitution of the 
country. Apart from ultra centralized countries like the UK in this matter, when it comes to 
social law, substantive input is also often made by social partners. Social partners also often 
steer and manage social protection institutions, and their decisions can be legally binding. 
Last but not least, an essential ingredient of the making of law is the public debate. The 
public discussion of law happens in the public spaces (nazionale Öffentlichkeiten, ekklesiai 
and sometimes agorai21): the media (press and TV, internet), parliaments, and it extensively 
relies on political communication. A special form of political communication – spin – is 
organized by politicians for marketing their ideas and persons to potential voters.  
In such Öffentlichkeiten and ekklesiai, debate is generally conducted in one national 
language (Van Parijs, 2010), the rule is “input legitimacy”, with voters directly electing the 
law makers (parliaments) and a government generally accountable before parliament. With 
the help of complex processes of socialization, citizens learn at least some fragments of law 
during their education: such socialization is highly unequal in EU societies and undeniably 
pertains to national democratic deficits, if one takes effective participation of citizens as a key 
ingredient of democracy (which some obviously don’t think  necessary, Moravcsik, 2002). In 
principle “nul n’est censé ignorer la loi”, but, in actuality it is often the case that only snippets 
                                                            
20 Comparing nations from this point of view may lead to identifying systems that are more or less 
democratic than others. This matter is often hotly debated in the national political “spaces”. 
21 As Castoriadis (2005) aptly noted, we should not confuse into one single “public space” what is 
happening in public-public space (the ekklesia) and public-private spaces (that constitute the agora). 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2011.65
11 
 
of the arcane legal discourse are known by the majority of citizens. Nevertheless, educated 
groups22 share a “legal consciousness” as part of their citizenship at national level. 
Accordingly, only specialised technicians and lawyers master the legal mysteries, and the 
length of the chain that goes from the drafting of law to its “implementation” is generally very 
tortuous and tricky. In certain countries, citizens, and most often interest groups, enjoy more 
rights of access to litigation than others. Entire sections of the populations are de facto 
excluded from the legal systems. Constitutional courts play an important role in the 
democratic life of member states, but they are not equivalent to one another: it is for instance 
well known that the French Conseil constitutionnel has many characteristics that mar its 
standing and independence, not to mention its legal expertise, when compared for instance 
to the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. 
All in all, however, one can admit that a second-best system of democracy is the rule at the 
national level, with significant accountability of the oligarchic elites, with a significant degree 
of participation in elections, a significant legitimacy derived by politicians from their 
elections, and a wide spate of legal rights that are upheld and defended, including before the 
European Court for Human Rights. Active debate happens in the public space, and directly 
challenges the choices made by politicians, who, in some countries live permanently under 
the scrutiny of a confrontational press (for instance in the UK). Nevertheless, national 
systems are all marred by democratic deficits of some sort, if one compares them with the 
ideals of democracy that Moravcsik prefers to banish in the country of illusions. 
3. Counterpart features of EU law 
What do we learn now when we systematically compare the features of the national systems 
sketchily described above to their counterparts at the EU level? 
Consociation, a transitory (?) form of democracy 
With an exclusive right for the Commission for presenting draft texts, law is made and passed 
by compromises between governments, on a consociational basis, in cooperation, in most of 
cases now with the European Parliament. This parliament consists of elected members who 
are accountable to voters. However, the link between elected representatives and their 
constituency is notably weaker than in the member states. Moreover, classic right/left divides 
are blurred in the European Parliament, where consensus politics prevail. This does not help 
of course to trigger impassioned debate in the national forums or public spaces. Additionally 
politicians in the Council and in the Commission are not elected and their nomination is the 
outcome of non public horse trading. Commission’s and Council’s officials, although they are 
strictly controlled by financial procedures, are not accountable in the national sense of the 
term, because they are not elected, and because no genuinely public debate takes place at the 
EU level. The public space at the EU level is actually fragmented into a myriad of forums and 
arenas, where actors with unverifiable legitimacy and obscure and changing networks have 
their say in influencing the final substantive compromises which are transformed in draft 
legislation proposed to the Council (lobbyists, big companies, experts, academics, 
associations and charities…). Social partners at the EU level are bound to be only one among 
these interest groups and so-called NGOs, although they enjoy special institutional 
recognition (Hyman, 2001; Marginson and Keune, forthcoming). Their position in this 
                                                            
22 Educated groups in western societies make up for the majority of societies (more than 80%). 
However, entire groups are excluded from the knowledge of law: this is for example the case of the 
young lower qualified people. 
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respect is in entire contrast with the national counterpart situations, and most strongly in the 
Scandinavian countries where they are not only “partners” but they are “parts” (parter in 
Danish, for instance) of the labour market, traditionally meaning that they are the exclusive 
and legitimate “owners” and contestants of this market23. This is one of the areas where the 
democratic deficit of the supranational level is immensely greater than its counterpart at the 
national level. This fact is consistent with the overall asymmetry existing between social and 
economic rights which we will analyze in the next section. When Arend Lijphart was advising 
the South African government (at the time, the racist National Party, led by Fredrick de 
Klerk) in favour of a form of “power-sharing” (between Blacks and Whites), and when Nelson 
Mandela was still in prison, consociationalism had its day in South Africa during the 
transition from apartheid, but now a majoritarian principle prevails and South Africans have 
equated this situation with democracy tout court. Consociationalism at the EU level has not 
certainly more chances in the EU than in former South Africa, to pass as fully democratic. 
Implementation of law 
Law is monitored by the administration of the Commission - which is also entitled to issue 
legally binding decisions - , but, essentially, it is “implemented” by national administrations 
and, in case of litigation, by the national courts, since, as of principle, it is supposed to be 
integrally part of national law. Additionally, national courts are always susceptible to ask 
preliminary rulings from the CJEU, or its tribunal of first instance. “Implementing” EU law, 
the Court’s Judges constantly create new case-law. Hence, when comparing national and EU 
law, one of the trickiest aspects lies in the fact that domestic law systems do not equally value 
the role of case-law, as against “statutory” law, adopted in Parliaments. As far as 
“implementation” of law is concerned, its process at the EU level is decidedly more arcane, 
obscure, uncertain and risky than the already obscure, specialized and uncertain process at 
the national level. This situation is, inter alia, the outcome of the length of the chain of 
actions that take place from the initial drafting to the eventual binding legal rule (Hartlapp, 
2007; Falkner et al., 2005). A situation can easily prevail whereby, unless explicit litigation is 
started, EU law may remains a “dead letter” as Falkner and her colleagues (2008) have 
observed for Central and Eastern European countries24. On the other hand, because of the 
dominant role played by the CJEU – a dominant role, by the way, which the Court created by 
and for itself, seizing the power at hand (Weiler, 1991)– all kinds of strategic moves from 
powerful actors may influence the actual consequences of EU law. It is interesting to learn for 
instance, that in order to counteract the counterpart moves by member states or by the 
Commission, EU-level Union representatives are obliged to develop strategies of litigation in 
the hope of achieving a better, more balanced consideration of social rights as against 
economic freedoms25. 
Whether ekklesia or agora no unified public space  
As has been often remarked, there is no possibility for European citizens, or, for that matter, 
for parties, interest groups, unions, NGOs, etc.., to discuss with one another, except in 
English, the only lingua franca. Contrary to the national situations, this has the immediate 
                                                            
23 It is precisely under the influence of the Court of Justice, but not only, that this situation has 
recently tended to be affected (see the Laval, Viking, Rüffert cases, and next section). For the case of 
Denmark, see Jørgensen and Schultz, 2011). 
24 This is confirmed entirely by one of our case studies, (Tomas Sirovatka, forthcoming, on the Czech 
case). 
25 Interview, ETUC, march, 29th, 2011. 
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consequence of excluding from direct discussion of EU law more than 85% of the population 
of the European Union which are not proficient in English26. Because they take for granted 
the rosy and false picture organized by the Commission27, superficial analysts contend that 
this is not a problem. N. Fligstein, (2008, p. 138-158) is typical of this superficiality (Streeck, 
2009), but he is certainly not the only one (by contrast, see Calhoun, 2007). 
The Commission’s “spin” (or “communicative discourse”) has indeed taken new forms since 
the first White Paper on communication in 2006, and it was reinforced during the second 
term of the Commission (Barbier 2011). Since the first significant failure in a referendum 
(1992, rejection of the Maastricht treaty by Danes), the Commission has been desperate to 
bridge the large gap existing with the voters in member states, starting by trying to make EU 
legislation clearer and leaner (Piris, 2006, p. 483), and trying to increase “ownership” of the 
EU by its citizens (Barbier, 2008). The basic argument of this manipulative “political 
communication” is that the Commission only works, without any partisanship, for the 
general interest of European citizens. Precisely, this discourse, in a simplified form – at times 
verging towards a simplistic narrative for purportedly stupid voters28 - is most often using 
politicized Barometer surveys to make half truths pass for what is supposed to be an 
“European opinion29”. Even this simplistic translation of political issues and topics posted on 
the website of the Commission and its Directorate Generals, is only known of a tiny elite. 
Dominantly, the national quality press ignores the debates happening in what they call 
“Brussels” and only report about problems that have direct echo in the national public 
spaces: one such topic has long been the question of immigration. And it has clearly 
accentuated its visibility since the beginnings of the economic crisis. Even in this case, as was 
illustrated for instance by the rows erupting about French policy about the Roma people, or 
Italian policy about the refugees from Africa and Romania, and more recently, about Danish 
projects to re-establish border controls in 2011, debates are never held in a cross-national 
manner. They remain confined and imprisoned in national places, and only a tiny elite can 
discuss these questions, provided it knows and uses English as the lingua franca. With 
respect to the debate about EU politics, and notwithstanding the national democratic deficits, 
the situation at the EU level is empirically leading to an ever more conspicuous absence of 
conditions for the possibility of legitimation processes. At the end of the day, even “output 
legitimacy” can only be ambiguous and dubious, because it is also influenced by spin doctors 
who actively interfere. 
Moreover, when one analyses empirical networks and forums as they really function “in 
Brussels”, one is struck by the extreme fragmentation of these “spaces” for debate, not to 
                                                            
26 Eurostat (2010, Stat/10/139) shows that only 13% of the working age population is proficient in a 
foreign language, which means: ability to understand and produce a wide range of demanding texts 
and use the language flexibly. On top of this, 15% consider themselves “good”, i.e., are able to describe 
experiences and events fairly fluently and able to produce a simple text. 
27 By contrast with Eurostat figures, the European Commission and N. Fligstein take for granted that 
more than 50% speak more than one language – English in their majority – just because these people 
are able to watch English speaking TV and find their way in broken English when they travel abroad. 
This is not proficiency however (Barbier, 2008, p. 253-257). See also Kraus (2008 & 2011). 
28 See the website of the Commission; especially DG Employment’s pages which have represented 
social policy as a circus. 
29 An interesting example was the publication, by the Commission, of a memorandum on the 26th of 
August, 2010 (IP/10/1071). The title of the memo proclaimed that Europeans were in favour of a 
stronger economic governance, and the figure was 75% of them. Hidden in the memo was the essential 
fact however, that a dramatic fall was registered by this spring 2010: only 49% of citizens did now 
think that Europe was a good thing for their country, a figure which had not been so low since 2004. 
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mention that most social actors participating in them are financially dependent on the 
Commission’s funding to an extent. As we will stress again later in this paper, alliances are 
explicitly made by certain sectors of the Commission’ administration with certain groups 
advocating certain causes30. 
Supremacy in practice 
As we have noted, arcane language for a small community is the rule for national law; this 
situation is even more marked at the EU level for various reasons. Whereas for instance, a 
common meaning is attributed by publics in many countries to the essential notion of “public 
services”, its “equivalent” of “services of general interest” is not known of in many countries31. 
The possibility of an existing “common legal culture” is extremely more improbable with 
regard to EU law, which as of principle is not grounded in any of the legal systems of the 
member states. In this respect, EU law appears as de-contextualised and privileging de-
territorialised universal rights (for instance, fundamental rights vis-à-vis traditional social 
rights). Indeed the very fact that EU law is formulated and translated in many languages 
implies that texts are written in a language cut from the ordinary legal consciousness of 
citizens. As our interviewees in the European institutions32 explain, words used in the 
national language versions of legal texts – 95% of which are drafted now in English33 – are 
actually intended to convey meanings different from the ordinary meaning the same words 
have in the national language (see also Kjaer and Adamo, 2011; Piris, 2006). A case in point 
here is the term “workers”, which is used in chapter 1 of Title IV of the Treaty (TFEU) 
(freedom of movement of workers), which means something different from the British legal 
term “worker”; accordingly the French version has “les travailleurs” a word which is to 
contrast with the mainstream French “salariés”; the German version, for its part, has “die 
Arbeitskräfte” instead of the German classic “Arbeitsnehmer”. Numerous other expressions 
could be quoted here, as, for instance the notion of “undertaking” used instead of the 
ordinary “enterprises”, “firms” or “companies”. In a guide for the adequate writing of EU 
legal texts, one of the guidelines prescribes authors (notably lawyer-linguists and reviser 
lawyer-linguists) to avoid terms which are too closely linked to the national legal orders 
(Piris, 2006)34. As a consequence, EU law appears as even more distant from ordinary 
citizens than national law, whereas EU institutions can rightly claim that theirs is the richest 
legal system of translations in the world with the aim of offering all citizens access to the 
letter of the EU law in all official languages. In the early 90s, Judge Mancini was 
congratulating himself and saying that the former ECJ was considered important by one out 
of five European citizens, because, he said, “visibility is the first precondition of legitimacy” 
(Mancini and Keeling, 1994, p. 185). Nearly twenty years later, visibibility has indeed not 
been achieved. When one consults the regular Eurobarometer publications that monitor the 
EU citizens’ “knowledge” of EU institutions35, one is not surprised that, relatively rarer than 
                                                            
30 Examples are EU NGOs such as EAPN and FEANTSA (our empirical interviews). 
31 In certain member states, the « EU concept is still studied » (Czech expert, Copenhagen conference, 
May, 2011). 
32 Interviews, March, 2011, with lawyer-linguists. 
33 Interview at the Council, March, 2011. 
34 “En ce qui concerne la terminologie proprement juridique, il faut éviter les termes trop étroitement 
liés aux ordres juridiques nationaux”, Guideline 5.3.2, p. 19 of the Guide pratique commun du 
Parlement européen, du Conseil et de la Commission à l’intention des personnes qui contribuent à la 
rédaction des textes législatifs au sein des institutions communautaires (French version, 2003). 
35 What kind of “knowledge” does one have when one has “heard of” something? This remains to be 
assessed. 
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for the corresponding national institutions, this (extremely uneven) knowledge has to be first 
interpreted in the context of corresponding national institutions (Cautrès, 2007). Moreover, 
increased knowledge does not entail increased trust, as the example of the CJEU shows36. 
The European Commission is extremely proud of fighting for “Human Rights” (we will come 
back to that in the following section, because this stance appears as the ultimate way of 
legitimizing its fight for the common good). However, ordinary citizens are left in the 
ignorance of what the new Lisbon treaty brings out for them, in matters of rights and 
entitlements. A good example of this can be read from the Commission’s 2010 Report on the 
Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights37: the report tells that more than 4.000 
letters were sent to the Commission by citizens who believed wrongly that the “new” position 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (as now referred to in article 6 of the Treaty of Lisbon) 
would bring them new rights. When reviewing the various groups of rights that figure in the 
list of this Charter, the Commission only found relevance in the area of human rights but no 
example whatsoever for the group of rights pertaining to “Solidarity”. On the other hand, 
more than 3 quarters of European citizens are ignoring the rights they can claim38. 
A special role for the CJEU 
In every aspect, the role of the CJEU is certainly essential to assess with comparison to 
apparently equivalent national institutions.  Apart from the adoption of EU legislation by 
mostly consociational arrangements, EU law comes from a praetorian source. And this, as 
Scharpf noted, is clearly linked to an “output legitimacy” that tends to presume the existence 
of trust “in the internal mechanisms of the judiciary” but also in the “validity of praetorian 
law through specialized discourse within the legal profession” (2000, p. 193). Trust in the 
validity however is not illustrated by surveys of EU citizens, and on the opposite, it has been 
challenged to the point that most of the recent referendums organized have failed to produce 
significant majorities. Uncertainty about the position of the CJEU, with regard to the respect 
of national constitutions is still a matter of debate (Viala, 2006, p. 149) although official 
doctrine contends that EU law prevails also over national constitutions. Whereas this 
hierarchy is seldom openly challenged, the possibility of conflicts of hierarchy has remained 
present, especially in the case of the German constitutional court. Moreover, the fact that an 
“interpretative community” (to use J. J. Weiler’s expression) has now existed for a long time, 
linking together networks of national judges and the legal profession, hardly means that 
“output legitimacy” for praetorian law is actually realized in the general public across the EU. 
Numerous, although indirect, evidence of this situation has piled up in the recent years in 
many member states. Leaving aside the ever special case of the United Kingdom, so-called 
“populist” parties have increased their following and electorate, whether in Denmark, where 
the Dansk Folkeparti is now pivotal in Danish political life, or in France, where the Front 
national is contemplating a second position in presidential elections in 2012, not to mention 
the Lega Nord in Italy or the group of far-right parties in Hungary, etc.. With their appeal to 
more than a fifth of the electorate, a theme that seems to link them together is an explicit 
denial of the legitimacy to the European Union. For sociologists, this brings empirical facts to 
consider.  
                                                            
36 At the end of 2010 (Eurobarometer 73) 69% of interviewees had “heard of” the CJEU, but 50% 
declared they had trust, whereas persons that distrusted the Court were increasing sharply since 2007 
(from 21 to 28%). 
37 COM (2011) 160 final, 30.3.2011 
38 Ibid. (see the 2010 Report of the European Ombudsman). 
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Differences as to the possible access of ordinary citizens to the Courts oppose national courts 
and EU level courts, where the possibility of litigation has remained extremely limited for 
individuals in exceptional cases. In an article devoted to the hagiographic and pro domo 
praise of the former ECJ, Judge Mancini was obliged to admit that, with regard to the 
possibility of ordinary individuals to challenge EU law before its courts, the ECJ had “let the 
individual down” (Mancini & Kieling, 1994, p. 188). More largely, the sentiment that, because 
the CJEU rules by way of case-law, the possibility of the reversal of existing jurisprudence – 
despite the a priori conservative bias of case-law - brings an important touch of uncertainty 
to the whole edifice of EU law, especially in social law, as we will see. Another important 
aspect pertaining to the CJEU’s role is the fact that its case law is decided in last instance, and 
cannot be challenged, except by a different decision – often unanimous – of the Council of 
the European Union (Ferrera, 2005). This situation may change when negotiations – started 
in 2010 – to make the EU accede to the European Convention of Human Rights will be 
completed. The unilateral Commission’s control of the agenda for proposals of legal 
instruments will on the other hand be slightly mitigated by the possibility of referendums 
promoted by a certain number of citizens, introduced in the Lisbon treaty. 
EU Law compared 
All in all, when one interviews officials in the national administrations39 who are especially 
and directly concerned with the application of EU law, and EU litigation, one often gets the 
impression that the whole process is beyond the grasp of any of its direct actors. Somehow 
deterministic reading of recent jurisprudence in social matters (Scharpf, 2010; Supiot, 2009, 
see next section) brings support to a view of EU law as a complex social process without 
identifiable authors (the case of “un procès sans sujet”) (see also Offe, 2009). This 
impression is also reinforced when careful analysis of the production of legal texts show that 
it is extremely difficult, if possible at all, to identify anything equivalent to the “legislator’s 
will” that exists at the national level (Kjaer and Adamo, p. 104; 109). Empirically, and despite 
the continually increasing powers of the European parliament, debate about EU law is 
immensely more distant from ordinary citizens than national debates that, however biased 
and twisted, are rather openly accessible to them, and linked to the possible direct sanction of 
politicians via regular elections. In this respect, the importance, variety and overall 
unaccountability of lobbies and all sorts of actors sharing access to influencing eventual EU 
legal norms, does not uphold the mainstream view of EU law as participating in “output 
legitimacy”. As a key normative orientation of the EU level processes of governance, the 
fiction of “general interest” is widely questioned by a number of social actors, and more easily 
than it is also challenged at the national level. Finally, the history of the European Union in 
the domain of law can be seen as bifurcated and biased: the best way to document this 
situation is certainly to consult the writings of lawyers and, most of all, of EU Judges40. 
EU law as Janus bifrons 
Certainly more distant from ordinary citizens, EU law is even further from any “legal 
consciousness” that is already shaky with respect to national law. Comparatively less 
“democratic” (or legitimate) in this respect, EU law nevertheless has acquired undeniable 
“output” legitimacy because of its substantive characteristics: the main one in this regard is 
                                                            
39 Interviews over 2011 in the social ministries and the Foreign affairs ministry in France. 
40 The ways Judges are nominated to Supreme Court and can hold their tenures is also an empirical 
source of divergence for their legitimacy. 
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the fact that supranational law brings with it better resistance to “la raison d’État”, by 
opening potential access to additional individual rights to citizens.  In this potential and not 
always direct access lies, according to our research, the main reason for which EU law has 
made its quiet progression in the Union. Indeed the development was, until very recently, 
quiet, if not secret. As specialists have told, the process was made by stealth: “the process 
itself went largely unnoticed when it occurred; its far-reaching consequences and significance 
were not appreciated at the time” (Weiler, 1991, p. 2436). Additionally, far from being a 
deterministic development, logically originating in the letter of the Treaties, the gradual 
importance, and supremacy of EU law was the outcome of deliberately political moves aptly 
made by the former ECJ over the course of its history.  
“Activism” was the rule, especially when sensitive situations happened, that the Judges aptly 
seized as opportunities for extending the reach of EU Law, in inventing the principles of 
“supremacy”, of “direct effect” among the most important ones. Such an assessment is not 
only made by Bourdieusian critique (Vauchez, 2007 and 2008). It is also explicitly accounted 
for by Judges themselves (Mancini, 2000; Weiler, 1991) and accepted by political scientists 
(Scharpf, 2010, Schmidt, 2006). A key reference, for instance, was the invention of the notion 
of “direct effect”, which is very widely considered as one of a few essential pillars of the 
validity of EU law (Weiler, 1991, p. 2413-2413 among many others). By their very contrast, 
the words “self-restraint” and “activism”, commonly used by legal scholars and judges 
indicate that the Court’s stance has systematically been political – and that it has always 
needed, and acquired fresh resources for its legitimization. Take for example the introduction 
of the “fundamental rights” doctrine (Weiler, 1991): it was a trade-off, strategic at that, for the 
Court to be accepted, in exchange with the introduction of “supremacy” – which, by the way 
happened in the midst of strong political controversies (de Gaulle’s contestation of the role 
played by the Commission). As Davies showed (1996, p. 124-125) the German court for 
instance was not to accept “direct effect” without something in exchange that could mitigate 
the absence of constitutional rights in the Treaty: the court responded by the doctrine of 
“fundamental rights” (cases Defrenne I in 1976 and III in 1978). In this respect, it is essential 
to stress that the introduction of the doctrine of “fundamental rights” plays a key role for the 
potential legitimacy of the Court of Justice, and much more importantly for the EU political 
system as a whole. The resort to “fundamental rights” was much later formalized in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (now referred to in article 6 of the 
Treaty, and considered by some Judges as autonomous and self-sufficient for the EU legal 
order41) the reference was precisely a politically intended move by the Court to counter 
existing critiques by national courts (Weiler, 1991; Mancini, 2000, p. 12-14). 
This is why it is important to come back to Max Weber’s conception of legitimacy.  In 
Economy and Society, Weber stresses an initial basic distinction between sociological and 
legal perspectives. For the former, what is important is “ce qui advient en fait dans la 
communauté” (volume 2, p. 11, French translation, Agora Pocket) ; there is a probability (une 
chance) that participants to economic activity “considèrent subjectivement que certaines 
prescriptions doivent être observées et se comportent en conséquence, c'est-à-dire qu’ils 
orientent leur activité conformément à ces prescriptions. C’est ainsi que s’établit la relation 
fondamentale entre le droit et l’économie” (id., p.11). Law is part of the process of 
rationalization42 of society and, among forms of domination (Herrschaft) that generate 
                                                            
41 Interview, Court of Justice, September 2010. 
42 Originating in the revelation of early religions and prophets. 
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legitimation, the modern form is precisely based on law, as opposed to tradition and to 
charisma. As a result, in the “legal-rational” form (legale Herrschaft), a key role is played by 
individuals’ beliefs in the legitimate order. The force of the legal order does not lie in the 
physical but in these beliefs, as to the validity of Herrschaft (see also Supiot (2005) for an 
anthropological analysis). In his Sociologie du droit (p. 29), M. Weber stressed two key 
elements of legitimacy for modern government: “Le gouvernement peut être lié à des normes 
juridiques et être limité par des droits subjectifs acquis (..) sa propre compétence reçoit un 
fondement en légitimité, un gouvernement moderne déploie son activité en vertu d’une 
« compétence légitime » qui juridiquement est toujours conçue comme reposant en dernière 
analyse sur le pouvoir (Ermächtigung) donné par les normes « constitutionnelles » de 
l’institution étatique. En deuxième lieu, cet assujettissement à du droit en vigueur et à des 
droits acquis conduit à un élément négatif qui consiste pour le gouvernement à devoir 
composer avec des limites opposées à sa liberté de manœuvre”.  
Inspired by Max Weber, Bourdieu (1986) has conspicuously omitted from his analysis to take 
into account the ultimate and substantial reasons for the justification of what is, in his view, 
pure domination power exercised in a “field”. His followers do similarly (Vauchez, 2007, 
2008). Nevertheless, the validity/legitimacy of law cannot be reduced to an illusion (illusio is 
Bourdieu’s term, 1986, p.7). Additionally, Bourdieu’s approach is deterministic43, because it 
underestimates the fact that law is made by actors who are unable to impose their legal views 
in any circumstances. This is all the more empirically observable at the EU level, where all 
sorts of interest groups compete for participating in the making of EU law, and where legal 
scholars, lawyers and judges enjoy a privileged position, but certainly not an unchallenged 
one. Characteristics of law stressed by Weber (Economy and Society) are still relevant for the 
interpretation of EU law: (1) the multiple nature of norms from habit/customs/conventions 
and written law that all have their validity;  (2) the fact that not only economic interests are 
safeguarded by the legal order, but also variegated interests, as for instance, the security of 
individuals; (3) the key part played in the making of law by organized economic interests; (4) 
the fact that extremely different legal systems can be reconciled with some universal form of 
economic activity44; (5) the fact that “même les moyens de coercition et de sanction les plus 
énergiques échouent quand les personnes en cause refusent de les reconnaître”. 
Additionally, among important characteristics stressed by Bourdieu, some are especially 
relevant for the study of EU law: (1) language/the power of nomination as a key factor; (2) 
the fact that the making of law happens on a specific scene with specific rules and actors; (3) 
the fact that there exists a “chaîne de légitimité” among actors: whereas it is empirically 
documented in the national context, this “chain” raises specific problems of identification in 
the context of the EU. To a certain extent, in each national context, and in very variable 
proportions, a kind of “common knowledge” of law exist, shared among legitimate actors who 
have at least some participation in its public debate and its negotiation, within  a bounded 
(national) and bounding framework of solidarity/reciprocity (Ferrera, 2005; Barbier, 2008).  
Deciding whether a functional equivalent of this “chain of legitimacy” exists at the EU level is 
not an easy empirical task however. This is where it becomes essential to understand what 
the forces are that support the legitimacy of EU law in its ordinary functioning. A wealth of 
literature has insisted on the well documented fact that economic interests, big firms and 
                                                            
43 Especially with the concept of ‘symbolic violence’ which is deemed to be literally incorporated into 
individuals. 
44 Some universal legal ‘lingua franca’ may be considered as a form of de-contextualised hyper-
rationalization. 
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capitalist organisations are at the forefront of this support, and play a key role (Scharpf, 
1999; Streeck, 1998, to quote only two). But what is less stressed in general, is that, apart 
from the overall liberalization development in the economy, perfectly consistent with the 
promotion of powerful economic interests, EU law has also decidedly promoted and 
safeguarded some rights of individuals from a liberal equality point of view: hence the 
prominent position of the “anti-discrimination” principle in EU law, which features, along 
with the principle of equality between men and women in the Treaty on the same level as 
European citizenship (article 2 of the TEU and part two, articles 18 and following of the 
TFEU). This is certainly not by chance then that a passionate defence of this claim is part of 
all the texts written by former judges of the ex-ECJ. And this is not either a surprise to see 
how the European Commission has eagerly attached its political communication (and the 
spin accompanying it) to this aspect of EU law and policies: just take the example of the 
extremely vivacious exchange in 2010 between the Commission and the French government 
over the fate of the Roma people in France. This is also not by chance that the first Report on 
Fundamental Rights established by the Commission enumerates a list of individual situations 
that EU law is especially organized to fight for: the rights of women to equality, the special 
situation of the Roma people, the rights of the disabled. In the same line of thought, it is also 
extremely logical that the Court (and the Commission with it) concur in the defending of 
marginal and excluded people: people asking for assistance, irrespective of their citizenship 
rights (on this see in particular Ferrera, 2005), poor people, homeless people, and so on and 
so forth. The otherwise uncertain legitimacy of EU law, conspicuously privileging powerful 
economic interests has found there a key basis for indispensable support.  We just have to 
read Judge Mancini’s plea (2000, p. 193) to understand the logic of this support, when he 
drew a list of individuals that had nominally benefited from the implementation of EU law – 
all chosen, note, in the realm of anti-discrimination: “they will do well to look closely at the 
Court’s case law and remember how many of Europe’s citizens have benefited directly of the 
Court’s rulings. They will for example remember the Belgian air hostess who claimed the 
right to the same rate of pay as her male colleagues [Defrenne –case 43/775, (1976)], the 
British nurse who objected to being compelled to retire several years earlier than a male 
[Marshall – cases 152/84 (1996)], the German woman who was prevented from getting a job 
as a canteen assistant at Cagliari university by a practice of discriminating against non-
Italians [Scholz – case 419/92 (1994)], the French student who wanted to study cartoon-
drawing at an academy of fine arts in Belgium and was required to pay a fee not imposed on 
Belgian students [Gravier – case 293/83 (1985)], the Greek hydrotherapist who asked only 
that his name should not be distorted beyond recognition, when transliterated by an over-
zealous German registrar of marriages [Konstantinidis – case 168/91 (1993)] and above all 
the millions of consumers who are the direct beneficiaries of a common market founded on 
the principles of free trade and undistorted competition. What citizen of Europe has not been 
assisted in some way by the rulings of the European Court in Luxembourg? (2000, p. 193). 
Support and legitimacy is thus called for by the ECJ from the Defrennes, the Graviers, and 
the Konstantinidis. This brings forward the existence of a rarely stressed alliance in favour of 
active support for EU law’s legitimacy: on the one hand, large economic interests motivated 
by the extension of the frontiers of the market, and, on the other, groups of citizens who have 
a particular stake, and pursue the particular advocacy of a cause; as we have constantly 
checked in our interviews for the present research, NGOs representing these advocacy 
coalitions provide one of the main pillars for empirical support for the EU, the European 
Commission [“an imperative in the daily action of the Commission” (Tizzano, 2008, p. 133)], 
and the European Court of Justice and its network of counterparts across the Union. For 
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instance, an objective alliance exists between the EU Commission, presently promoting the 
interests of the homeless people, the NGO which leads this advocacy coalition in Brussels 
(FEANTS), and the private providers of housing across the member states. This coalition 
stands directly against the interests of the owners of social housing in the Netherlands – who, 
according to statistics and to the Commission’s view – are abnormally rich or middle class45.  
Similarly, NGOs promoting a better recognition of extremely rare diseases were very active in 
the coalition of actors that eventually achieved the adoption of the 2010 directive on cross-
border healthcare46. What also strikes the researcher who reviews a very complex legal 
practice and tries to make sense of it from a sociological point of view is how “de-
contextualised” these individual or small groups’ causes appear when they are dealt with by 
the Court of Justice. This is all the more striking that, at the same time, international law 
seems to be more and more attentive to the plurality of values across the world (Delmas-
Marty, 2011, p. 14; 21; 198, in particular). 
What remains to be seen however, in the following section, is how this is articulated with the 
way EU law that deals with social rights, social rights that are dominantly collective and not 
individual (Camaji, 2008, see also Tizzano, 2008, p. 134). As we will see, in the social 
domain, as well as in EU law in general, an important distinction has to be made between 
citizens who are mobile and citizens who are not. 
2. The insertion of social law in the broader legal architecture: room for 
solidarity? 
In this section we continue our systematic comparison between EU law and national law, in 
order to understand more precisely the impact of EU governance on social policies in 
member states. We concentrate on EU law, and ignore, for the moment, other mechanisms, 
as for instance social dialogue or open methods of coordination. We proceed in three steps 
for each level: first, we assess the insertion of social law in the broader legal framework; 
second, we look at the relationship of social law with public debate and politics; finally, we 
assess the outcome of social policy. 
1. Social law at the national level 
The central political role of social protection and social rights 
Since the late 1960s, and as an outcome of historic class struggles (in matters of labour law) 
but also of innovations and new ideas by enlightened elites (in matters of social protection, 
Merrien, 2007) social law in Europe is integral part of law; admittedly the situation in 
Eastern and Central European countries is different, but these new member states have 
caught up at least partly, since the fall of the socialist system. What is more, across the EU, 
issues dealing with labour law and social protection (another way of saying “social justice”) 
provide an essential – if not the essential – part of the public debate, of public controversies 
about redistribution and labour markets. This means that the debates about the “social” is a 
key element of democracies in Europe and a key factor explaining what cohesion there is in 
societies. On paper at least this hard fact is routinely acknowledged by the EU institutions 
(Jepsen and Serrano Pascual, 2006). This has an important consequence: despite imbalances 
                                                            
45 We refer here to the case, pending (in 2011) before the CJEU, that opposes the Dutch government 
and the Commission, with regard to what the Commission sees as a “manifest error” of the Dutch 
government in defining what is “general interest” in the area of social housing. 
46 Interview, March, 2011, French ministry of social affairs. 
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between the interests of groups in societies, and the always unequal and imperfect 
application of law in reality, social law and other branches of law have acquired a common 
legitimacy over the last century (Supiot, 2005). Social rights were even explicitly recognized 
internationally at the highest level of cross-national conventions (Supiot, 2009). This means 
that, at the national level, social law (social protection and social rights) is part of the general 
architecture of law, submitted to the common development of checks and balances and to 
“judicial review” (or its equivalents) by relevant institutions and courts. 
Social law is at the heart of society (Schnapper, 1991), because, along with fiscal rules, it is 
able to identify deserving individuals (Van Oorschot, 2006), to organize redistribution on a 
legitimate basis, with effective procedures for consultation and publicity. As we have shown 
in more detail (Barbier, 2008) processes of solidarity today are still essentially organized at 
the national level (sometimes, at the infra-national one). This is not by chance. Some 
characteristics of nationhood (le fait national) are indispensable for the definition of social 
protection and the solidarity that accompanies it. The pioneering work of Maurizio Ferrera 
(2005) is a precious guide in this regard. He demonstrates that, throughout its history, social 
protection has always presupposed two social mechanisms: first, the “bounding” of a 
territory, linked to the existence of nation-state boundaries, and second, “bonding”, the 
creation of a bond of solidarity or sharing within the boundaries of the national community, 
which may temporarily include immigrants. As a consequence, social protection systems are 
marked by numerous dimensions linked to the nation, the nation-state and the national 
community: territory, nationality, residence, language, citizenship, a sense of belonging to 
the community (one of the forms of identification), etc. One of the key elements of this 
relationship lies in individual and collective willingness to share resources within a given 
political community. This aspect has been studied especially by Scandinavian researchers in 
an effort to ascertain whether their system can endure in the face of contemporary trends of 
individualisation and globalisation (Rothstein, 1998; Svallfors, 2002; Goul Andersen, 2008; 
see also Van Oorschot et al., 2008). The category of the nation (Leca, 1992) covers both 
subjective phenomena – affective, normative, imaginary (Anderson, 1983) and cognitive, 
individual as well as collective – and objective practical and institutional aspects, which are 
all relevant to social protection. One can present them in three steps. First of all, social 
protection in democratic societies, which involves interconnected political, economic and 
family relations, is based on social conditions of legitimacy and solidarity. Second, the 
primary vehicles allowing individuals to access social protection and participate in its 
construction are citizenship and identity/identification. Finally, the entire system of social 
protection rests on formal institutions and practical arrangements that are profoundly 
marked by their national roots (Barbier, 2008). 
As a consequence, national legal systems derive their consistency from the fact that under an 
autonomous constitutional order, they are covering all areas of law. Additionally, since the 
second World War, national law – at least in the older member states of the  EU  - has been 
interconnected with international legal instruments (ex: the Human Rights convention of the 
Council of Europe) (Roman, 2010). This process took place prior to the existence of EU law, 
and independently. In matters of social law, an important – although partially 
implemented47, legal instrument – has been in force since the 1960s, and a special Comité des 
droits sociaux is in charge of ruling over cases presented not by individuals, but by 
                                                            
47 Akandji-Kombé & Leclerc (2001) show that the instrument is adapted to the various ratification 
processes decided by the member states, and that is has very different legal consequences across them. 
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organisations. Consequently, because of their long history, and embeddedness into the social 
reality in member states’ legislation, social rights are fully recognized by the courts of the 
country and are a constitutive part of the legal system. These rights have legally binding 
effects, they are fully “justiciable” at the national level. The substance of social rights is 
mainly enjoyed by citizens at the national level, whatever the importance of systems of 
coordination we will allude to later. 
The pivotal role of social law in public debate 
Moreover, social law and social policy provide a great part of the substance of what is 
discussed in the public and in daily politics: this is the case for pensions, healthcare, benefits 
for the poor and the taxes that are needed to fund them, sharing or not sharing these benefits 
with foreigners, immigrants (Barbier, 2008). Governments often stumble on reforms that the 
publics (or the Öffentlichkeit) do not like, and they have to draw back their reforms, as was 
for instance the case in France when then Prime Minister D. de Villepin had to resign because 
unions and students refused the introduction of a special contract for the young in 2006. 
Another example occurred in Germany when the Grosse Koalition government had to 
withdraw the reform of unemployment assistance for the older unemployed in 2007. Apart 
from discussions about security (internal and external security) and, less often, the 
environment, these issues account for the essential substance of public debate, accompanying 
debates in the national parliaments and decisions by governments (often compromises 
between parties). Law in general, but social law in particular is accordingly changed 
according to the coalitions (Left- or Right-wing) that are in place, and these issues are highly 
politicized. In some cases, social law (and the budgets accompanying it) is fought against in 
the streets. (By comparison, only tiny and de-territorialised demonstrations happen in 
Brussels.) 
When the national social law order enters into contradiction with the EU legal order 
Thirdly, apart from the active promotion of human rights in general and anti-discrimination 
in particular, national social law has increasingly emerged as in contradiction with EU law. 
This is noted by an increasing number of scholars in the recent years (Höpner, 2008; Ferrera, 
2005 and 2009; Barbier, 2011; Scharpf, 2010). An important point should be stressed at this 
point: the concept and interpretation of “subsidiarity”. The subsidiarity principle had now 
been part of a special Protocol of the Treaty for some time (since the Maastricht Treaty). On 
the face of it, social competences are still the preserve of member states, and as will be seen 
more in detail, social policies definitely belong to the national level. However, this does not 
mean that national sovereignty has been completely preserved in this domain. This happened 
for two main reasons: the first one is that, because of the general principle of the supremacy 
of EU law (applicable at the EU level, but also in the national legal orders) social rights have 
become increasingly challenged by the implementation of legislation on free movement (free 
movement of workers, of capital, of services, of goods, and the right to free establishment in 
another member state). The special realm of labour law, which is dominantly a part of the 
national legal orders, is constantly challenged, to the point that practically no domain of this 
law can be considered as really exempt of EU influence48. The other reason for this ever 
                                                            
48 In interviews, we are told by legal experts belonging to EU institutions that the EU legal order is a 
whole that practically leaves no area of national legislation unaffected by EU law (except certain 
domains like criminal law).  Doctrinal differences however exist about the actual consistency of the EU 
legal order. 
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increasing influence of EU law on national social law is due to the privilege that EU 
institutions have gradually acquired on many domains linked to the functioning of the 
economy. A case in point here is the question of social services of general (economic) interest 
(Krajewski et al., 2009). Superficially, a common view of “subsidiarity” equates the notion 
with the defence of sovereignty: this view was shared by the large majority of our 
interviewees who spoke of “subsidiarity” when they wanted to support arguments against 
what they thought was undue and illegitimate action from the Commission in areas that have 
remained within national jurisdiction49. The same applies, de facto to labour law (Rodière, 
2008). Some scholars even talk of “usurpation of competences” (Höpner, 2008, p. 30). In 
reality, on the example of social services of general interest, subsidiarity also means that EU 
law is ultimately the reference as to assessing whether member states do not make “manifest 
errors” in declaring such and such an activity of “general interest”, as we have noted for the 
controversial question of social housing (Guinard, 2009). Once a service is deemed to be of 
“economic” nature, EU law is competent – despite the “wide discretion” remaining for 
member states – and prevails in this case as in others over national law. 
A double legitimacy for social law at the national  level 
Finally, national statistics are telling: between one third and one half of GDPs are currently 
spent in member states for redistribution and social policy in general (including of course 
education) (Barbier, 2008). This brings about undeniable output legitimacy to national social 
policies and to national social law. The national level thus enjoys a double process of 
legitimation, first by participation to the discussion of law, and the election of members of 
Parliament (input) and second, by the result that the very fabric of national societies is linked 
to this huge process of redistribution taking place through education, healthcare, pensions 
and other social services – not to mention the funding of public services in general. 
Parliament and government legislate about redistribution and substantial redistribution 
happens at the national (sometimes infra-national) level. In this respect solidarity50 mainly 
belongs to the national level. Against this substantial and substantive solidarity, that is even 
protected as we will see by case-law, the promises of other forms of solidarity have remained 
elusive. As is well known, and despite Judge Mancini’s praise of the benefits of the EU for its 
consumers, there is no such thing as solidarity between consumers. The rationale of 
expecting something from the EU level in terms of solidarity rests entirely on the prospect of 
more efficient services, if they were organized at the EU level, and systematically submitted 
to the competition in markets. However empirical substantiation of this economic theory 
claim that the markets will ever provide more quality and more efficiency has yet to be made. 
Nevertheless, in the economic thought favoured by the CJEU (Neergaard, 2009), the 
provision of social services is always a priori seen as a best outcome of the markets: in the 
words of one of the Commission’s specialists of law, the best and most efficient way of 
providing social services is resorting to “vouchers”, that allow the consumers to buy their 
                                                            
49 This view is constantly used for instance by our interviewees when they describe the resistance of 
German representatives for the EU legislation in matters of poverty. 
50 We see “solidarity” as a socio-economic principle, with the ability exercised (and politically 
legitimated) to share collective resources (taxes and benefits) among citizens or individuals, as they are 
part of a community: such communities maybe national, regional, occupational, etc. and obviously 
also include families. Solidarity can also happen at cross-national level: it is illustrated when natural 
catastrophes trigger the sending of relief and aid across the world. 
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services from whatever providers51. How then is it possible to compare social policy at the EU 
level with the national level, this is what we shall see in the following section. 
 
2. Social law at the EU level 
Social law: marginal and asymmetrically treated 
If, as we saw in the previous section, a crucial turn was deliberately made by the former ECJ 
in the domain of human rights, the same cannot be said of social law, which, since the early 
treaties, has remained marginal in the wider architecture of EU law, and is treated 
asymmetrically, in direct relationship to the EU’s overarching mission, i.e., building a market 
and unleashing the economic freedoms that were deemed to produce efficiency and 
satisfaction for European consumers. 
The role of social law (labour law and social protection) has remained marginal because it 
always was to remain, at least officially, the preserve of member states’ jurisdiction. The 
initial, economic logic of the founding act has continuously informed subsequent 
developments. Even if we admit that the social dimension has, since 1957, been addressed 
more extensively52, as the ECJ’s evolving jurisprudence demonstrate (de Schutter 2004), 
economic and social rights are still not treated in an equivalent way in EU law, 
notwithstanding the formal adoption of texts establishing social rights.53 While freedoms of 
circulation and the freedom of establishment constitute a hierarchically superior legal base 
for the Union, because they are supposed to permit better competition and improved 
functioning of the single market, social rights are only taken into consideration to the extent 
that they might be affected by the functioning of the market (or, conversely, affect the 
market’s functioning). Strictly speaking, and with few exceptions, application “for their own 
sake” does not constitute an explicit political task for the EU. To cite but one example, 
indirectly linked to social protection: if the EU is concerned with languages, this is primarily 
and legally justified by the fact that language education may have consequences on 
individual mobility and freedom of circulation, and not because of the cultural value of 
languages per se. 
A second principle applied to social protection as a whole concerns the supremacy (if not the 
exclusivity) of national jurisdictions over Community ones. In the core areas of social 
protection, member states have resisted quite well until now, even if highly important rules 
(notably those established by the former ECJ) constrain national decisions (Ferrera 2005; 
Leibfried and Pierson, 1995). This resistance has been greater in the field of education; the 
difficulties encountered for adopting the Erasmus programme in 1987 is probably a good 
                                                            
51 Professor Julio Baquero Cruz, seminar on social services, Copenhagen, May, 13, 2011, Faculty of 
Law. 
52 For instance: in the important domain of discrimination legislation. 
53 E.g., the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers, adopted in 1989, and the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which deals with social rights in Chapter IV (Solidarity), 
adopted at the Nice Summit in December 2000. The right to education and vocational and continuing 
training appears in article 14, in the chapter ‘Freedoms’, and the right to cultural, religious and 
linguistic diversity is found in the ‘Equality’ chapter, article 22.  
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example of this (Corbett 2003).54 In the area of social protection as elsewhere, three 
principles prevail: the direct effect of Community law; the supremacy of EU law over 
domestic laws; and the principles concerning economic freedoms, associated with the 
principle of fair competition. These principles, which have gradually been consolidated, 
directly or indirectly “command” the whole apparatus of member states’ law in all areas. 
When an affair is submitted to the CJEU, they provide the basis for all legal interpretations. 
Admittedly, these may be overturned, but this requires a decision of the Council of Ministers, 
which is not easy to arrive at, as is demonstrated by the lengthy battle, probably just getting 
under way, over the free circulation of services, which, to a great extent, should be seen as 
essential for the future of social protection in the EU. 
Social law at the EU level is thus often considered – especially in the founding members of 
the EU, as marginal, and sometimes, futile. It mainly looks as if it concentrated on general 
principles with little consequences, and no actual justiciability, as in the case of the long list 
of rights that feature in the chapter “Solidarity” of the European Charter of Fundamental 
rights. All these rights are de-contextualised, de-territorialized and, so far at least, have never 
constituted serious legal basis for defending the social rights of a majority of European 
citizens, who are covered by their own national legislation. To make it simple: social law will 
come into the scope of EU law essentially in two main cases: one is when it contradicts the 
complete development of economic freedoms; the other one is when it is – as an auxiliary – 
associated with one of these economic freedoms, and more often, with the freedom of 
circulation for “workers”. Historically, the main domain where European influence was 
exerted was the “coordination of social security” systems for migrant employees – a very 
small group indeed. The main legal instrument used was Regulation 1408/7155: in a nutshell, 
its objective was to open up national systems in such a way that “workers” (and their 
families) could be eligible to benefits even when they worked in another member state: for 
instance, family benefits were paid to the family of a Portuguese worker employed in France 
by way of a mechanism coordinating family funds in France and Portugal56. Thirdly, the 
‘hard-law’ influence of the EU-level over national legislation was at its highest in the domain 
of health and safety at work on one hand and in the domain of equal opportunities for men 
and women (equality and anti-discrimination in general) on the other. However, apart from 
this variegated influence upon national systems, it can be argued that their essential 
substance and regulation, as well as the social justice and solidarity principles upon which 
they have rested were consistently left to the national competence during the period. 
Perhaps more generally, sociologists inquiring about EU law are bound to be struck by the 
fact that the main corpus of thought, the backbone of this type of law is founded on economic 
theory. “Economization” of law is stressed by many lawyers. When it comes to “public goods”, 
for instance, among which social protection traditionally features, the mode of reasoning of 
the CJEU is strictly arranged according to economics, and marked by the influence of one 
school in the legal discipline, “Law and Economics” (Supiot, 2005; 2009, Neergaard , 2009, 
p. 44-47; Prosser, 2005). What strikes observers even more, by contrast to national law, is 
                                                            
54 The success of Erasmus is often cited, but by its twentieth anniversary, if more than 1.5 million 
students had participated in it, they represented only about 1 percent of the potential flows. At the end 
of the 1980s, the Commission aimed at much higher figures, around 10 percent.  
55 Now replaced by Regulation 2004/883. 
56 I refer here to the matter discussed in the Judgement of the Court “Pinna vs Caisse d’allocations 
familiales de la Savoie” in 1989 (March, 2, 1989), a judgement which started a controversy and an 
updating of the Regulation 1408. 
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that, in spite of the rhetorical presence of “solidarity” as a legal notion, there is little if any, 
substantive “solidarity” going on at the EU level. More, “solidarity” is the essential category 
that allows for exceptions to the law of the market. The famous 1993 Poucet-Pistre rulings 
constitute the key reference in this respect, because this case-law has historically established 
(actually, created) the characteristics of what can be seen as a typical social programme that 
is exempted from complying with the competition of the market. Ironically, far from being 
sheltered by the market, social protection is thus “protected from the market” (Borgetto & 
Lafore, 2010). This tells a lot and encapsulates the crucial de facto opposition that exists in 
EU law between individual and collective rights. Admittedly, legal doctrine often tells that 
case-law is a vehicle for path-dependency and conservatism. However, the fact should be 
stressed that two crucial pillars of social security, two essential tenets of the classic welfare 
state, namely “state” pensions and “state” healthcare are depending not on any provision of 
primary law, but on the possibly fragile ground of a 1993 ruling that could be reversed 
(Driguez, 201057). 
When social law is hardly debated about 
A situation prevails in the EU whereby the only forums where social law is debated are the 
European Parliament – the accountability and visibility of which has already been seen here 
as shaky58 – and the institutional mechanisms that organize the consultation of social 
partners, especially since J. Delors established the Social Dialogue, in  the 1980s (Barbier, 
2008). The outcome of this situation is that national legal arrangements prevail, not only in 
practice, but also in fact. At the most, as the endless discussion about the revision of the 
Working time directive have illustrated for the last 10 years or so59, EU social law is about  
“minimum standards” – which, in the case of many countries of the EU, are even hardly 
implemented (Falkner et al., 2008)60. At the worst, debate would happen only because a case 
emerges, as in the Laval and Viking cases or in the Commission versus Germany case61 where 
national arrangements struck between social partners are threatened by the application of 
EU legislation about economic freedoms.  “Negative” notoriety of EU law has thus provided 
the only opportunity for debate recently across the Union. The European Commission and its 
agents – who are (sometimes painfully) conscious of this situation – have been trying to 
compensate this absence or aloofness of the debate with superficial political communication 
through websites and rhetorical repetition of the importance of solidarity within the 
European Union. Jose Manuel Barroso has been especially active in this latter respect. In 
2006, he talked for instance about fighting illegal immigration: “It is of the utmost 
importance that all Member States of the Union work together in a spirit of solidarity, not 
least to assist those southern Member States most affected by illegal migration from Africa. 
Current joint efforts to help Spain, Italy and Malta constitute a concrete example of this 
European solidarity.”62 In another similar instance, during the “Greek crisis” first phase, the 
President declared to the Financial Times:  “There is no stability without solidarity and no 
solidarity without stability”63. Especially during the first stages of the “bail out” (as the vague 
political concept goes) of Greece, and later of Ireland, the project was not supposed to have a 
                                                            
57 This author noted that it could well happen. 
58 See Eurobarometer, 74, autumn 2010 for precise figures of “trust”. 
59 See case study, France, F. Colomb. 
60 See also case study, Sirovatka, the Czech Republic. 
61 See ETUI reference about collective agreements and complementary pensions/social security. 
62 http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_6224_en.htm 
 
63 March 22, 2010, “Barroso demands solidarity on Greece”. 
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direct impact on the member states’ budgets. Nevertheless, in Greece and in Germany public 
debate immediately touched upon the point. But both debates remained separate: separated 
from one another because of the absence of a common language (Barbier, 2008; Kraus, 2011; 
Grin, 2011). 
Ouptut legitimacy? Minuscule solidarity and legal uncertainty 
How then could EU “social policy” contribute to the formation of output legitimacy for the 
European Union in the social domain? Citizens of Europe are often painfully conscious – as 
the Greek citizens and the Irish at the moment of writing – that the only real security they 
can fall back on lies in existing national programmes – notwithstanding their overall 
threatening through austerity strategies (Barbier, 2011). As anyone knowing the EU is well 
aware of, the EU budget is tiny with comparison to member states’ budgets – a large part of 
which is devoted to “social expenditure” earmarked for social protection in general (including 
education). Because member states roughly spend between one third and one half of their 
revenues for a “social purpose”, it is no wonder that the EU budget is dwarfed by the national 
ones, with its 1% of GDP current limit. Nevertheless there exists a form of financial solidarity 
at the EU level, implemented through the Structural Funds, and also the Common 
Agricultural Policy – which has always been centred on sustaining farmers’ incomes since the 
beginning of the Communities. These two dominant items in the EU budget make for about 
80% of the 1%. This figure offers a realistic measure of EU solidarity. Hence, the common 
goods that can substantiate output legitimacy obviously originate in the national organisation 
of solidarity: no Greek unemployed contributes to pay for the German unemployed…and vice 
versa, although European elites are now considering more and more unacceptable the alleged 
discrepancies between social justice principles among EU countries64. 
Again, President Barroso’s political campaigning illustrated this recently. In the run-up to the 
second referendum about the Treaty of Lisbon, in October 2009, he suddenly made the trip 
to Limerick in Ireland to advertise the contribution of the EU to Ireland, especially in the 
form of a special grant attributed to redundant workers in Limerick: “Solidarity is one of the 
defining hall marks of the EU.  We all know that Ireland has benefited hugely from its 37 
years of EU membership.  To the envy of many, Ireland showed that it was able to take the 
opportunities given with both hands and to use the good educational levels and strong 
creative instincts of the Irish to turn a country of emigration and low living standards into the 
success story that it is today.”65 The particular grant came from the “European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund (EGF)”. The fund is perhaps the best incarnation of the dire limits of 
solidarity at the EU level: it was decided by the EU Council in December 2006, with the aim 
of enabling “the EU to show solidarity with and provide support to workers made redundant 
as a result of major structural changes in world trade patterns” [EFG Regulation, SEC (2008, 
16.12.2008), p. 2]. In May 2009, the number of workers concerned by the EU measures was 
less than 15000 people. The European Commission later presented an updating of the EFG 
regulation as a major contribution to the fight against the economic crisis. At the time, the 
sheer number of persons concerned and the tiny amount of budget earmarked for their 
support (500 million euro, of which about 10% had been spent) vividly illustrated the true 
                                                            
64 Undeniably, German politicians are at the forefront of such a debate. One among a hundred 
examples was E. Stoiber, the former minister president  of Bayern, who, in the Süddeutsche Zeitung 
recently declared: “Es kann doch nicht sein, dass andere mit 59 in die Rente gehen und wir in 
Deustchland diskutieren die Rente mit 67.” (21-22 Mai, 2011, p.6) 
65 Speech on the 19th of October, 2009,, see http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/press_office/speeches-
press_releases/barroso-limerick-city-council_en.htm  
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balance between the national level and the EU level of governance. While this text is being 
written, in the midst of an unending crisis with redundancies and extremely high level of 
unemployment, persisting poverty rates, the EFG has not even been spent entirely66. In terms 
of redistribution, proper solidarity happens mainly at the national and sometimes infra-
national levels, not to mention family solidarity (Van Oorschot et al., 2008).  
Could however one claim that, with the advent of “European citizenship” introduced in the 
Maastricht Treaty, substantive solidarity has been making progress? What of the role played 
by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has an entire chapter devoted to 
“Solidarity”? Unfortunately, as the latest (2010) Commission Report about Human Rights 
has shown, little justification for output legitimacy has so far come from this side.  
Since the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon from the first of January 2009, legal scholars 
have been announcing that the reference now made explicit to the Charter by article 6 of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) was good news for European citizens. However, this has 
meant very little so far in terms of new references to the Treaty by the CJEU, and extremely 
few, if any, good news for the support given to social rights. Nevertheless, general principles 
of the Charter, in its chapter “Solidarity” include: workers’ rights to information and 
consultation in the undertaking; collective bargaining and action; access to placement 
services; fair and just working conditions; prohibition of child labour and protection of the 
young; family and professional life; social security and social assistance; healthcare; access to 
social services of general interest (SSGIs); environmental protection; consumer protection. 
All these rights however only materialize (=are justiciable) at the national level. Moreover, 
the Court’s brief is with economic freedoms, and more and more, its case-law has 
contradicted the preservation of national systems of social protection (Barbier, 2008; 
Scharpf, 2009; Ferrera, 2009). Given that the general principles of the Charter were drawn 
from already existing international conventions and national legal traditions, the prospects of 
solidarity extending through EU law have remained extremely limited so far67.  
Additionally, at the EU level, unlike at the national level, citizenship – particularly social 
citizenship – is “framed” or effectively “embedded” into the freedom of movement of persons, 
a right which could equally be said economic or “fundamental” (a civil right if we use 
Marshall’s classification). This is why, since its inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty, European 
citizenship has unfortunately remained, de facto, the full preserve of only a limited number 
of citizens in Europe: those who are able to move. This is very clearly illustrated in the 
formulation of the treaty: the only classic social rights presented in it are those of migrants 
(art. 21.3). In fact, one dimension that is perhaps difficult to understand for non-specialists, 
and citizens themselves, is that EU law in the area of citizenship targets situations of 
movement between member states (Rodière, 2008, p.195; 265). A paradoxical situation may 
arise when, for instance, a citizen does not exercise his or her freedom of movement. Then, 
for instance, he or she will not be able to claim the application of EU law in the area of family 
reunification (ibid.) nor could he or she, if the movement took place within the territory of 
the member state of which they enjoy citizenship. In both cases, citizens are not really 
deemed to have “moved” and they will be subject to national legislation in the domain of 
family reunification. 
                                                            
66 380 million euro were spent by March 2011 and 76,000 people supported. 
67 2010 Commission’s report on the charter: page 8-9: Women, the Roma, and mobile people are the 
main people mentioned, with regard to their right to translation, right to know where to file a 
complaint in another country, etc. 
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The only dimension of EU citizenship which is not directly or indirectly linked to movement 
is that citizens have the right to vote for the European parliament. To this, protection against 
discrimination established in the same part of the treaty (in Part two, articles 18 and 19 deal 
with discrimination, just before article 20 deals with EU citizenship) may also be added – 
although this is not a citizenship right in the strict sense. One aspect of this discrimination is 
linked directly to movement – that is the prohibition of discrimination on “grounds of 
nationality”. However, the other aspect is much broader, because it concerns (article 19) all 
the most common grounds for discrimination (“sex, gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”). Here again, the ambiguous and “Janus-faced” 
nature of EU citizenship appears: on the one hand, it belongs to fundamental rights (also 
present in the list of the Charter of Fundamental rights of the EU, the ones former Judges of 
the Commission like to say they are proud to have contributed to, as Judge Mancini did, and 
rightly so), and, on the other hand, it is a consequence of the freedom of movement. Freedom 
of movement is also a “Janus-faced” right. All the major components of EU citizenship 
concern citizens who are keen on moving and do actually move: they enjoy diplomatic 
protection in other member states, and they enjoy the right – under certain limited 
conditions – to reside in any member state of their choice. The right to vote in another 
member state, in either municipal or European parliament elections, is also strictly linked to 
free movement. All in all, the major dimensions of EU citizenship, except the right to vote for 
the European parliament in reality concern the tiny number of people who work or reside in 
another member state68. As was already mentioned, the main exception in terms of 
significant European influence on social and labour rights has been equality between men 
and women, because of the unexpected spill-over effects of the initial provisions in the Treaty 
of Rome (namely, ex-article 119, see Davies et al., 1996).  The great majority of legal experts 
we have been interviewing since the 2009 implementation of the Lisbon Treaty share the 
view that the reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (its article 6) will not 
substantially modify this situation in the future. As was already the case before the adoption 
and the reference to the Charter, in matters of Human Rights the Court of Justice’s case-law 
referred to legal sources originating in Member states’ legislation and constitutions, as well as 
to the European Convention of Human Rights (Council of Europe). Thus it is not in the small 
amount of funds devoted to correcting minuscule imbalances across the Union, nor in the 
protection of the rights of the European citizens that one will easily find substantive solidarity 
in Europe.  
Finally, because the very rationale of the impact expected from EU law is to destabilize 
existing arrangements (with negative integration) in order to expand the realm of the market 
forces, along with this very limited scope available for solidarity at the EU level, legal 
uncertainty is the other, complementary, character of the impact of EU law: uncertainty for 
the future sustainability of healthcare systems, of pension systems, of labour law and 
collective agreements, of social services of general interest, i. e. public services. Uncertain 
benefits – despite their certain expectation in mainstream economic theory – are also the 
order of the day, when it comes to future efficiency and quality outcomes deriving from better 
administered programmes and systems. 
 
                                                            
68 Currently estimated at between 1 and 2% of the working age population. 
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3. EU law as a crucial innovation in the social field: individual and 
“collective”69 social rights, supported by diverse coalitions of actors 
One may claim that, in the area of labour law and social protection, the main innovation that 
was introduced in the 1990s is EU law. Given the well documented fact that social 
“competences” have remained the preserve of nations, the affirmation may seem paradoxical. 
However, the EU legal system is Janus-faced, like the former Latin god of doors. In the social 
domain, on one hand it has introduced new individual rights (including for firms) and new 
legal accesses to rights: this was done first by way of the CJEU’s bold borrowing from the 
constitutional orders of member states and, very importantly, from the Human Rights 
reference. Hence, rights pertaining to the category of fundamental rights are extremely 
important. They are too often overlooked when analyses only focus on social protection and 
solidarity programmes. However, social protection rights seem not to be fully considered at 
the EU level.  
In this respect, EU law has increasingly jeopardized “collective” social rights (such as 
“corporatist” arrangements), sometimes destabilized existing systems of social protection, 
even contributed to their demise, without providing alternative solutions at the EU level. 
Fundamental rights are envisaged at the EU level also with a double face: on the first face of 
Janus, is the attractive defence of fundamental rights, like for instance equality between men 
and women, or, for that matter, the principles of prohibiting discrimination between them. 
On the other face of the coin, is the “economic” dimension of these rights, which tend to be 
de-contextualized and implemented via case-law without heeding the existing solidaristic 
systems that took so much time to build over the two last centuries in Europe. Because of an 
asymmetrical dominance of the freedoms of movement, potentially all other rights are in 
jeopardy, and the principle of subsidiarity seems to be relegated to a token principle, seldom 
used in the CJEU’s case law. Because of an asymmetrical system of law, citizens who are on 
the move do enjoy additional rights with comparison with the majority of European citizens 
who do not move, more often than not because of their lack of resources and linguistic skills. 
Because of the asymmetrical European legal system, essential functions of law in the social 
domain, that have been cherished by unions and sometimes also employers’ organisations in 
certain countries, are seen as mere exceptions to the mainstream situation of the production 
of goods and services, deemed to be inevitably the best when it happens on the market in the 
context of free competition. At the end of the day, the global impact of EU law on social 
protection and social rights appears as mixed. The uncertainty it has brought to EU “national 
social models” can certainly not be presented as blissful progress, and further uncertainties 
are piling up when one takes into consideration the way EU law is produced. 
The social process that we have been considering in the present paper however should not be 
considered as determined. We met social actors who fight for or against the promotion of EU 
law or its change. When one sees evolutions of labour law and social protection in Europe 
with the hindsight of the last 40 years, many developments were not forecasted. In the early 
90s the talk of the day was predicting the final crisis of the welfare states. But this never 
materialized. Despite forming a particularly privileged group70, “de facto oligarchy”, existing 
                                                            
69 Our notion of “collective” certainly does not claim to be an adequate legal category: the rights 
involved stem from the organization of various forms of solidarity, within communities, professions, 
populations, and so on. This includes for instance rights which are exercised collectively, as the right 
for industrial action. For an extensive legal discussion, see Camaji (2008). 
70 Interview, March, 2011, former référendaire at the ECJ. 
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besides the oligarchies of states (Delmas-Marty, 2004, p. 187), the dominant actors who 
today craft EU law are not isolated from the rest of European societies. Judges are part of 
cross-national networks including national lawyers and courts that are bound to register 
direct reactions in their national legal orders. NGOs and lobbies, interest groups, may have 
held the dominant positions in the Brussels arenas and forums, but they probably have 
controlled the process so far and influenced it in an asymmetric manner because much of the 
process of creating and implementing EU law was happening by stealth. As Viala (2006, p. 
141) rightly noted, the stance taken so far by the makers of EU law cannot easily go on like it 
has thus far, as if following “Un volontarisme qui semblerait n’avoir cure des contraintes de 
l’enracinement linguistique. Tout se passe comme si les États européens avaient fourni la 
preuve qu’il existe, en état d’apesanteur, une rationalité juridique formelle qui puisse se 
laisser découvrir et se répandre (...)” ce serait “l’idéal de la modernité juridique fondé sur 
l’universalisme anhistorique du droit.” 
In sociological terms, the gradual progress of EU law cannot be seen as if it were a process 
without actors. Now the era for a “permissive consensus” attitude from the part of electorates 
in member states is definitely over. Key milestones testify for the changing times: the failure 
of referendums in the Netherlands, in Ireland and in France; the discarding of the infamous 
“Bolkestein” directive; recent alarm raised by the Monti Report commissioned by 
J.M. D. Barroso in 2010 about the single market. New awareness was triggered by decisions 
of the CJEU in 2007, and an increasing attention seems to develop – not only in Belgium, 
France and Germany, with regard to public services, the so-called social services of general 
(economic) interest. The mounting pressure of parties that are characterised by elites as 
“populist” demonstrate to national governments and to EU elites that their populations are to 
be convinced, as the German minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, recently remarked, with regard to 
the German voters71. Certainly the resilience of national languages (Orwell, 1946) is a hard 
fact of politics in Europe, too often forgotten especially by elitist “cosmopolitan” views (Beck 
& Grande, 2004) that ignore the politics of everyday life and the limits of the English 
language as lingua franca (Ostler, 2011).  
The assumption is increasingly made by legal scholars (including in the ranks of the 
Commission’s administration) and by legitimate stakeholders, that fresh innovation is 
needed in the area of social law. Demands are made in the forums in Brussels, and this might 
herald unexpected developments, especially in times of deep economic crisis. In the 
meantime, far-reaching legal uncertainty is however here to stay for quite a long time in the 
future.  
                                                            
71 “Es sei möglich, dass als Lehre aus der Euro-Schuldenkrise die Notwendigkeit einer weiteren 
Integration hin zu einer politischen Union erkannt werde. Davon müsste dann aber erst die 
Bevölkerung überzeugt werden.” Süddeutsche Zeitung, (8. Dezember, 2010). 
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